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PRIVACY REMEDIES
LAUREN HENRY SCHOLZ*
When consumers sue companies for privacy-intrusive practices, they are often
unsuccessful. Many cases fail in federal court at the motion to dismiss phase because
the plaintiff has not shown the privacy infringement has caused her concrete harm.
This is a symptom of a broader issue: the failure of courts and commentators to
describe the relationship between privacy rights and privacy remedies.
This Article contends that restitution is the normal measure of privacy remedies.
Restitution measures relief by economic gain to the defendant. If a plaintiff can show
the likely ability to recover in restitution, that should be sufficient to pass muster at
the motion to dismiss phase even if the court is unconvinced that the plaintiff could
show a case for compensatory damages flowing from harm.
This argument intervenes in the scholarly literature in two ways. First, it supports
the realist perspective that remedies are constitutive of rights. The election of
restitution as a remedy suggests that privacy should be conceptualized in tort as
quasi-property, and that contract and/or restitution claims should be a standard part
of privacy infringement pleadings. Second, it challenges the view that defining
specific and stronger privacy rights at law would be sufficient to increase privacy
protection. If any privacy rights are to exist at all, they must be linked to
proportional, accessible remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts struggle to determine when privacy infringements that occur in cyberspace
are sufficiently “concrete” to allow standing in federal courts.1 This Article argues
that underenforcement of the privacy right has resulted from failure of courts and
commentators to consider restitution as the quintessential remedy choice for privacy
matters. Remedies are best understood as components of the rights they enforce.
Remedies allow the scope of the right to be tailored to the facts of each case.
In an amicus brief in Spokeo v. Robins, a group of leading remedies scholars
argued that the argument that a privacy plaintiff needed some sort of concrete harm
to get into federal court was fundamentally incorrect as a matter of law. 2 Remedies
law is the field of law dealing with what a court can do for the winning plaintiff (and
to the losing defendant).3 The First Congress anticipated the ability for plaintiffs to
collect remedies measured by defendant’s gain. 4 Restitution is the form of relief
measured by the defendant’s gain. 5 There are many examples of longstanding
restitution claims throughout American law that do not require a showing of harm to
stand.6 The remedies scholars named ten familiar causes of action that do not require
plaintiffs to show harm beyond the violation of their legal rights: commercial bribes
and kickbacks, business opportunities, other conflicts of interest, misuse of
confidential information, forfeiture of fees, infringement of intellectual property,
trespass, conversion, rescission, and the slayer rule.7 They called upon the Court to
“stand up for restitution.”8 In a showing of judicial restraint, the majority remained
silent on the question of restitution’s relationship to the law of standing in the
opinion.9 The parties, after all, had not even addressed restitution as a remedy in their
briefs. Yet, the evidence the writers of the amicus brief showed was incontrovertible.

1. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (promulgating the
current standard for standing to state a claim in federal court that plaintiffs must suffer a
concrete, discernible injury—not a “conjectural or hypothetical” one (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court’s metaphor of concreteness to describe a matter sufficiently weighty to
afford the attention of federal courts is hardly helpful for digital harms.
2. Brief of Restitution & Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339).
3. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 1 (9th ed. 2018).
4. Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock & Mark P. Gergen, Brief of Restitution and
Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent: Spokeo v. Robins, WASH. &
LEE SCH. L. SCHOLARLY COMMONS (Sept. 8, 2015), https://scholarlycommons
.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/486 [https://perma.cc/H4AR-JNDC] (“Statutory minimum recoveries for
defendants’ violations of plaintiffs’ individual rights without proof of pecuniary damages or
actual harm were well known before the American founding. Indeed the First Congress
enacted at least one statutory minimum recovery.”).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
6. Rendleman, Laycock & Gergen, supra note 4.
7. Brief of Restitution & Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
supra note 2, at 6–18.
8. Rendleman et al., supra note 4.
9. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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Unjust enrichment has been both a cause of action and a measurement of relief since
the founding generation of the United States.
If, indeed, restitution is the quintessential privacy remedy, 10 the “harm problem”
that has so antagonized privacy advocates and scholars 11––that is, the difficulty in
defining a measurable economic harm issuing from privacy infringements––does not
need to be solved in order for privacy claimants to be heard and to receive relief.
Courts consider the likelihood that the plaintiff shows eligibility for relief at the
pleading phase.12 Both in and out of federal courts, the notion of standing is a concern

10. I do not mean to say that restitution is the exclusive remedy for privacy infringements.
See discussion infra Part II.
11. E.g., Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of DataBreach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV 737 (2018).
12. Several recent cases have dismissed privacy claims for lack of constitutional standing.
E.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012) (involving theft of several
laptops from defendant’s corporate headquarters, with medical and personal information for
over one million AvMed customers contained within those computers); Svenson v. Google
Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 717, 717 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (claiming that “after defendants processed
consumer’s payment for an application downloaded to her mobile device, they included
sensitive identifiable data about the consumer when remitting funds to third-party vendor”);
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d. 646, 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (bringing
“putative class actions against insurer, alleging violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), negligence . . . and bailment, stemming from theft of consumers’ personally
identifiable information (PII) from insurer’s computer network” by hackers), rev’d and
remanded, 663 Fed. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F.
Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (involving hackers that infiltrated LinkedIn’s computer
systems and services and “posted approximately 6.5 million stolen LinkedIn users’
passwords” and user email addresses); Low v. LinkedIn, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (alleging that personal information of consumers, including browsing histories,
were disclosed by defendant to third-party companies); Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d
88, 88 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (claiming EMT invaded plaintiff’s privacy by “disclosing private
medical information to plaintiff’s co-worker”). But some very prominent cases have found
standing for privacy plaintiffs, most notably three recent circuit court opinions. Galaria, 663
Fed. App’x at 388, 389 n.1 (finding “substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably
incurred mitigation costs,” supported standing in data breach case because theft of personal
data by ill-intentioned criminals placed them at “continuing, increased risk of fraud and
identity theft” and plaintiff “suffered three unauthorized attempts to open credit cards in his
name”); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding
that plaintiffs had standing to sue in the wake of a breach even though they had not experienced
fraudulent charges on their credit cards because those plaintiffs knew from the fact that other
plaintiffs’ cards had been used fraudulently, that their personal information had been stolen by
individuals who intended to misuse it); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding increased risk of identity theft constituted injury in fact where someone
had attempted to use stolen personal data to open bank accounts because plaintiffs had alleged
a “credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop” with the
unencrypted names, addresses, and Social Security Numbers of 97,000 employees); In re
Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157–59 (D. Minn.
2014) (finding that “unlawful charges, restricted or blocked access to bank accounts, inability
to pay other bills, and late payment charges or new card fees” incurred by plaintiffs constituted
injuries in fact in the wake of the theft of credit card and personal data of 110 million
customers).
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important to judges.13 The most influential theorization of privacy was done in two
law review articles, written in 1890 and 1960––well before the idea of standing
became a mainstay of legal culture. 14
Courts’ concerns with privacy cases, though, run deeper than the standing
question. Courts worry that recognizing the privacy right in the absence of a clearly
defined concrete harm may lead to unpredictable, excessive damages based on
plaintiffs’ subjective perceptions. 15 But much of the scholarly literature on privacy
focuses on defining privacy rather than explaining how the state should act when
privacy rights are violated. As Anita Bernstein has put it, “[f]rom the vantage point
of [a potential plaintiff] the causes of action available for virtual injuries probably do
a better job of describing than remedying.” 16 An approach that takes assessing and
measuring privacy remedies seriously, and integrates that into understanding the
practical scope of the right, would squarely address courts’ concerns about runaway
relief for privacy infringement. This is precisely the ambition of this Article.
The legal realism movement has influenced modern legal discourse so deeply that
observing the prevalence of the phrase “we are all legal realists now” has itself
become a cliché.17 However, one central––and mostly forgotten, at least in terms of
current influence––element of the legal realism movement was the principle that
remedies should be “constitutive components of rights.” 18 Karl Llewellyn, a leading

13. See, e.g., Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 40 N.E.3d 746, 752–53 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (explaining that federal standing principles are similar to those in Illinois and
in turn dismissing data breach claims under Illinois law because risk of identity theft and
emotional distress did not amount to injury in fact sufficient to support standing). A common
move in privacy cases is to remove to federal court under any available pretense to access the
federal standing rules. E.g., Wickens v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., No. 15cv834-GPC (JMA),
2015 WL 4255129 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (district court remanding to state court); Barricks
v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., No. 4:11-CV-1386(CEJ), 2012 WL 1230750 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12,
2012).
14. It is uncontroversial that standing gained new import starting in the mid-twentieth
century. Some commenters claim that the idea of standing was a novel invention, others
contend it is a natural evolution of existing principles. Compare Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 689–91 (2004)
(providing a historical analysis that argues that standing doctrine has deep roots in the common
law), with John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (finding “[t]here was
no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century”).
15. See, e.g., Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 653–57 (finding injuries stemming from theft
of consumers’ personally identifiable information from insurer’s computer network
insufficient to find standing), rev’d and remanded, 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); In re
LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1092–94 (holding allegations of economic
harm from company failure to protect user privacy were insufficient for standing).
16. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1462
(2012).
17. Professor Michael Green is typically cited for this observation, who has more recently
noted that “people have said ‘we are all legal realists now’ so often that it has become a cliché
to call it a ‘cliché.’” Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism, WM. & MARY, http://msgre2
.people.wm.edu/Legal%20Realism.html [https://perma.cc/P3LU-JXQ5]; see also Michael
Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2005).
18. Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 5, 7 (2011).
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mid-twentieth century realist legal scholar, said, in addressing the problem with a
rights discourse that assumes remedies are wholly separate from rights, the approach
tends to “double the tendency to disregard the limitations actually put on rules or
rights by practice and by remedies.”19 This echoes concerns raised in modern policy
discussions about privacy rights. The main fear of privacy skeptics is a slippery
slope: recognizing privacy rights will inevitably lead to limitless and arbitrary
damages for opportunistic plaintiffs. 20
Considering privacy rights alongside their remedies addresses the fear of
overenforcement of privacy rights due to their vagueness. Taking privacy remedies
seriously contributes to (1) clear boundaries for the rights and (2) adequate protection
of the rights when infringed upon. Privacy advocates cannot assume that merely
conceptualizing a right to privacy can protect privacy interests, even if that right is
enshrined in statutory law.21 Without remedies to deter infringement of privacy, and
disgorge violators of rents, recognizing privacy rights at law is meaningless. And
without predictable rules for the measurement of privacy remedies, courts will be
loathe to rule in favor of recognizing privacy rights.

19. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 13 (1962).
20. See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); see also Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right
to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1122–23 (2000)
(“[E]xpanding the doctrine to create a new exception may give supporters of information
privacy speech restrictions much more than they bargained for. All the proposals for such
expansion—whether based on an intellectual property theory, a commercial speech theory, a
private concern speech theory, or a compelling government interest theory—would, if
accepted, become strong precedent for other speech restrictions, including ones that have
already been proposed. The analogies between the arguments used to support information
privacy speech restrictions and the arguments used to support the other restrictions are direct
and powerful. And accepting the principles that the government should enforce a right to stop
others from speaking about us and that it’s the government’s job to create ‘codes of fair
information practices’ controlling private parties’ speech may shift courts and the public to an
attitude that is more accepting of government policing of speech generally. The risk of
unintended consequences thus seems to me quite high.”).
21. One of the more common type of privacy article is the categorization article, that is,
an article that seeks to impose order on privacy by defining and describing subcategories or
the phenomenon, usually drawing on nonlegal social science methods and perspectives in the
process. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484
(2006) (“The purpose of this taxonomy is to aid in the development of the law that addresses
privacy.”); see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477,
514 (2010) (“Although the framework presented here does not provide concrete solutions to
privacy problems, it does illustrate how much the privacy matrix has broadened, and continues
to broaden, since the advent of the Web 2.0 era.”). The problem with many categorization
articles is that they do not make clear how precisely these categorizations will help lead to
better-protected privacy rights, beyond the general observation that it will provide
policymakers with more information and “clarity.” But see M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of
Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1153–56 (2011) (justifying the distinction between objective
and subjective privacy harm, but also noting that seeing the right this way guards against
dilution of the right, creates a rule of recognition for new privacy problems, and decouples
privacy harm from privacy violations).
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The illustrative case this Article will use to show the value of evaluating fit
between right and remedy in constructing privacy rights is the case of trafficking in
personal data by third-party companies.22 Through evaluating the relevant types of
privacy claims and the suite of available remedies, I conclude that restitution is the
most appropriate measurement for the plaintiff’s relief for this type of infringement.
Despite an increasing number of plaintiffs succeeding in unjust enrichment claims or
restitutionary remedies for privacy infringement in the courts, 23 privacy scholars and
advocates have largely ignored this phenomenon.
By focusing on one example, I do not mean to suggest that privacy rights are
uniform. The characteristic that unites all privacy infringements is the mechanism of
infringement. Privacy is a quasi-property right, like its cousins trade secret and
information misappropriation.24 That means it is a relational right to exclude.25 The
right to limit access or use of personal information is not freestanding against the
world but rather is triggered by contextual factors to do with the relationship (or lack
thereof) between the plaintiff and defendant. Considering remedies shows that not
every infringement of privacy must amount to the same sort of remedy, and that there
are fair and predictable measurements of privacy remedies. Remedies allow the law
to create proportionality in the enforcement of interest. In this way, this Article seeks
to mainstream the privacy right,26 that is, to have the interest evaluated and enforced
like other similar rights rather than as an exceptional right. Ryan Calo has observed

22. For a detailed description of the data-trafficking industry, see infra Part II.
23. E.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that
current or former members of health care plans who brought action against plan operator in
Florida state court, relating to identity theft incidents, stated a claim for unjust enrichment);
Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 735 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding
insurance subscribers who “brought action against healthcare providers and insurers, asserting
various federal and state law claims arising from data breach that occurred when hackers
secured access to confidential health care information through a cyber attack,” alleged
restitution claim); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding
plaintiff who claimed that “employer failed to maintain security of his personal identification
information in connection with theft of company laptops by other employee,” alleged
restitution claim); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(denying motion to dismiss on unjust enrichment claims for Facebook’s “advertising practice
of placing members’ names, pictures, and assertion that they ‘liked’ certain advertisers on
other members’ pages”); State v. Moua, 874 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (finding
that where defendant had engaged in identity theft, victims whose private identifying
information was stolen were entitled to restitution).
24. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1116
(2016) (describing privacy as a quasi-property interest).
25. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, but Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1894–1906 (2012) (defining quasi-property as a relation right to exclude based
on status, context, and conduct).
26. Here, I am using the term “mainstream” in the way Danielle Keats Citron does in
Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010). In that article, Citron argues
that rather than inventing new privacy torts, privacy tort law could invoke already mainstream
tort doctrines.
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that courts tend to use a more exacting harm standard for privacy cases than for other
torts, even other dignitary torts, in lawsuits. 27
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will describe the role remedies
play in the enforcement of rights and show that courts and commentators have not
discussed the key role privacy remedies play in determining the scope of privacy
rights. This has resulted in the underenforcement of privacy rights in the courtroom
and contributed to the undervaluation of consumer privacy in the market economy.
In Part II, I will discuss the case of trafficking in sensitive consumer data by
companies unknown to consumers. I will discuss the available causes of action and
the possible suite of remedies, and conclude that restitution provides the best fit
between right and remedy. This conclusion can be applied to many––though not
all—instances of privacy infringement. In Part III, I will discuss the implications of
this analysis. Getting around the “harm problem” will allow privacy cases to proceed
further in court or for privacy matters to be settled on terms more favorable to privacy
plaintiffs than in the status quo. This would both increase knowledge of privacy
norms and promote protection of privacy in society. Further, attention to remedies
bounds the scope of the privacy right and strengthens our understanding of what the
privacy right constitutes. This is because remedies specifically tailor the law’s impact
to the behavior and incentives of individuals. Looking at the right-remedy nexus
forces the law to confront most immediately what its purpose is in intervening in
private interactions.
I. THE ROLE OF REMEDIES IN PRIVACY LAW
In this Part, I will explain the relationship between rights and remedies and argue
that remedies can potentially play a significant role in defining rights, drawing in
particular on Hanoch Dagan’s work on pluralism in remedies.
Judges, lawmakers, and other stakeholder must confront both the threat of
overenforcement of privacy interests and the reality of underenforcement of privacy
interests. Scholars have historically had an outsized influence in shaping the path of
the law of privacy, as these groups often look to scholars to suggest how to balance
these two concerns.28 This Article contends that a reflective return to practical
consideration of remedies can help define and bound the privacy interest. Remedies
are institutionally situated and can bring the conversation back to the issues that most
concern policymakers, judges, and stakeholders.
In Remedies, Rights, and Properties, Hanoch Dagan argues that remedies define
the rights they enforce.29 Furthermore, a “multiplicity of potential remedies” is an

27. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361 (2014)
(“[C]ourts and some scholars require a showing of harm in privacy out of proportion with
other areas of law. Many also assume, counterintuitively, that the information industry
somehow differs from virtually every other industry in generating no real externalities.”).
28. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that privacy torts show the
influence of legal periodicals on the courts); see, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp.
845, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (attributing several states’ adoption of privacy torts to Warren and
Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy).
29. Dagan, supra note 18, at 1.
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important means for the law to refine doctrines and “accommodate qualitative (and
normatively attractive) distinctions between different types of rights.” 30 He argues
that rights and remedies are interdependent, and neither should be marginalized.
Most of the privacy literature has assumed an approach to privacy that considers
rights to be independent of remedies. That is, it assumes courts determine what rights
a plaintiff has without reference to the remedies that right may yield, and determining
remedies is a wholly separate, subsequent procedure that occurs after a court decides
what rights the plaintiff has. Court decisions and scholarly articles written on privacy
operate in the shadow of William Prosser’s Privacy and Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy.31 Remedies are an afterthought in both papers,
sketched only very briefly in Warren and Brandeis’s article, and not discussed at all
in the Prosser article.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a rash of articles pointed hopefully at the
possibility of considering privacy as a type of property interest.32 This was intended
to give privacy violations the status of property infringements, which would include
powerful equitable remedies such as injunctive relief. This would appear to be the
long-awaited movement the field needed to take privacy remedies seriously. Several
scholars argued that liability rules simply were not strong enough to protect the
privacy interest.33 However, property interests can be sold via contract. The worry is
that people will contract away their property. Many scholars have argued that there
would be excessive administrative complexity if the law created a presumptively
unalienable property right in privacy. 34 Furthermore, a presumptively unalienable
property right in privacy would run counter to mainstream popular notions of
property.35
This debate was steeped in the classic framework for understanding the distinction
between liability and property interests as described by Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed.36 In the article, Calabresi and Melamed distinguish between
liability rules and property rules. 37 This Article can be critiqued for unduly

30. Id.
31. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
32. For a comprehensive summary of this debate, see my discussion in Scholz, supra note
24, at 1120–24.
33. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142–63 (1999)
(advocating the use of property rights to protect privacy on the internet); Patricia Mell, Seeking
Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26–41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2385 (1996).
34. E.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1284–85 (2000) (outlining skeptical perspectives on privacy as property); Pamela
Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2000).
35. See Litman, supra note 34; Samuelson, supra note 34.
36. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter
Cathedral].
37. Legal Theory Lexicon 052: Property Rules and Liability Rules, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON (Aug. 13, 2006), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/property
_rules_.html [https://perma.cc/2PTT-RVBP] (last updated July 1, 2018) (providing a broad
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simplifying remedies analysis.38 There is more to a discussion of remedies than
whether privacy––or any other interest––falls into the broad category of property or
liability. The scholars who advocated a property approach did so because they
presumed different and superior remedies would be available for the infringement of
a privacy interest. However, they also constructed highly conditional and difficult to
alienate property rights for privacy as property. 39 For property rights that stray from
the ideal of real property, the law’s approach is still difficult and developing, 40 so it
is not clear that courts would award remedies similar to the remedies for real property
rights even if the privacy interest was not disclaimed via contract. It is important to
note that it is not inevitable to consider property rules as distinctly different in kind
from other rules. In other Western jurisdictions with similar legal and moral
foundations as the United States, damage to personal dignity is seen as unique for
similar reasons as property and therefore not presumptively subject to relief with
money damages.41 Ronen Perry has persuasively argued that there is an economic
bias against imposing liability for relational losses that cannot be supported by
consequentialist rationales for imposing liability in matters. 42
Those that opposed the privacy as property framework largely objected on the
basis that the alienability of property would lead to worse privacy outcomes than a
liability model.43 The question of remedies is not significant to this critique.
So for different reasons, both the pro-property and anti-property sides of the
debate did not parse the relationship between specific remedy options and the privacy
right. The questions of what remedies would best vindicate privacy rights and what
remedies might set asunder a good balance between privacy and other interests has
rarely been addressed in the legal literature, with some notable exceptions. 44 But the

summary of the Calabresi and Melamed article and a discussion of how American lawyers and
law professors tend to use it).
38. Doug Rendleman, Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction to Protect the Environment,
75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (critiquing the Cathedral article’s analysis and
vocabulary). The remedies choice is between compensatory damages, plaintiff’s loss,
restitution, defendant’s gain, and an injunction. The choice between liability rules and property
rules is too limited; one of the Cathedral article’s drawbacks is that it doesn’t discuss the
remedy this article focuses on, restitution, at all.
39. E.g., Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons,
54 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 922–929 (2003); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2096–116 (2004).
40. Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
41. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 219 (2006).
42. Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573 (2008).
43. E.g., Samuelson, supra note 34.
44. Katy Barnett, Gain-Based Relief for Breach of Privacy, in REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
PRIVACY 183 (Jason Varuhas & Nicole Moreham eds., 2018) (discussing the use of restitution
in privacy cases in Australian law); Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory
Estoppel and Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 898
(2009) (discussing remedies in the context of confidential disclosures on platforms); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003); Joel R.
Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas B. Norton,
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conflation between torts and property in light of the protection of privacy interest is
understandable. As the works of Joshua Fairfield have described and analyzed, the
transition from an industrial economy to an information economy has created
changes in social organization of property rights that has, incidentally, resulted in
less protection of privacy interests without a corresponding conscious choice about
how society would like privacy interests to be allocated.45 As a result, Fairfield has
argued for an interpretation of property rights that would allow property interests to
defend privacy in the way they have historically been able. 46
The turn of the century is-privacy-property debate often categorically assumed
the inability of liability interest to provide sufficient enforcement to practically
defend privacy. A more nuanced analysis of liability interests shows that they are
very capable of protecting valuable and important interests in society. After all,
commercial law is powered by contracts and licenses, and few would argue that
nonproperty commercial interests are unprotected or contractual obligations go
unenforced. What determines whether a liability interest is pro forma or of great
consequence is what remedy is associated with its violation.
The case law also suffers from consideration of remedies when considering the
privacy interest. Courts, for their part, have largely stuck to conclusionary analysis
regarding the presence or absence of a harm.47 The analysis as to why a harm is not

Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485 (2015); Jay Weiser, Measure of Damages for Violation of Property
Rules: Breach of Confidentiality, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75 (2002); see also Anita
Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457 (2012) (discussing
remedies for injuries in cyberspace, including but not limited to privacy injuries).
45. JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM (2017). Fairfield explicitly and eloquently rejects the idea of accepting just any
property rights in property as a panacea. Id. at 11. (“By no means are property rules a magic
cure. Property is not good or desirable in and of itself. Good property rules let humans work
together; they make cooperation easier. Bad property rules reduce people to the level of
commodities and prepare resources for easy theft by the powerful and unscrupulous. So here
is the guiding principle for this exploration of property rules in a digital age: property rules
should be measured by a human yardstick. Where they do not make human lives better, where
they do not expand the range of possibilities for what humans can perform, they should be
reformed.”).
46. Id.
47. E.g., Pearce v. Whitenack, 440 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014) (“Nor is there
liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public
highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public
eye. . . . By analogy, Pearce’s Facebook posting was a walk on the Internet, the information
super-highway.” (citation and emphasis omitted)); People v. Stipo, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688, 691
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“A subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information
he supplies to his Internet provider. Therefore, his challenge to a warrant requiring his Internet
provider to identify him through his Internet Protocol (IP) address has no merit.”). But see
Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1218 (Cal. 2007) (“Unlike a person’s appearance or activities
that occur in a public place, and unlike personal information about a person that is contained
in a public record open to inspection by the general public as a matter of law, personal
information about a person that happens to be known by the person’s relatives or close friends
is not information that has entered the public domain. A person’s interest in preserving the
privacy of such information—the very interest the intrusion tort was designed to protect
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present is often superficial or absent. Analysis of the harm is absent where courts
seek to avoid analysis of compensatory harms based on the theory that any disclosure
of information anywhere constitutes consent, obviating the potential for relief from
the privacy tort.
This Article examines how remedies can help define and enforce the privacy
interest even if one understands it as a nonproperty right. This Article begins the
important work of showing how we should think about choosing remedies for the
myriad of privacy interests recognized at law. The following two Parts will illustrate
the virtues of considering rights and remedies as interdependent in the case of the
privacy interest.
II. ILLUSTRATION: THE CASE OF CONSUMER DATA TRAFFICKING
This Part discusses the relationship between the problems privacy regulation
seeks to solve and possible remedies for privacy invasions. This Part will use thirdparty personal data trafficking as an illustrative example of what it means to consider
privacy rights alongside remedies.
First, it defines this Part’s illustrative example: third-party consumer data
trafficking. Second, it describes the available causes of action available against the
data traffickers, with reference to the underlying principles of privacy law. Then, it
considers the remedies available against the data trafficker. Finally, it argues that the
best-fit remedy against the data trafficker is typically restitution. This finding shows
the limitations of superficial court analysis of remedies at the motion to dismiss
phase. If, in at least one important area of privacy and possibly others, the correct
remedy is not compensation, but restitution, privacy cases should not be dismissed
simply because a harm cannot be shown. The analysis is incomplete.
Third-party data trafficking is a widespread phenomenon that impacts virtually
every person in the United States.48 These companies do not have a relationship with
either individual users whose information they possess or with major platforms49
(i.e., Facebook, Google, etc.) on which consumers might be posting information. 50 It
is important to note that because of the wide range of information sources these data
traffickers take advantage of, one does not need to be a prolific Facebook user or
even the owner of a Gmail account to have extensive personal information in the
account. Data traffickers combine online and offline data to build their databases on

—would be substantially undermined if a would-be investigator could employ any means
whatsoever to extract or obtain such private information from a relative or close friend.”
(citations omitted)).
48. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, at iv (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data
-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL6D-23CP].
49. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 135, 142
(2017). But see Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89–91 (2016)
(using a different, more narrow definition of platform, specifically platforms for peer-to-peer
services, such as Uber).
50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48.
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American consumers.51 One must simply use a debit card and have conducted basic
transactions, such as being an employee, buying a home, or simply having public
records of any kind. This is impossible for almost anyone in American society to
avoid. At least one prominent data trafficker has 3000 data segments for nearly every
American consumer.52
This Article uses the term “data traffickers” rather than “data brokers,” a term that
has been used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and some other
commentators. This is because the term “traffickers” encompasses both actors who
engage in wrongful conduct and actors who engage in nonwrongful conduct. 53 By
contrast, the term “brokers” implies a level of legal and social legitimacy that
participants in the industry have not yet obtained. The issue of which data trafficking
practices are legal and what reforms should be made to further regulate the industry
is a live one. That makes the term “data broker” inappropriately conclusory as
applied indiscriminately to all actors who buy and sell data.
The federal government has long been concerned with the potential for
exploitation of individuals by actors with access to their personal information. In
1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was passed.54 This statute covers the
provision of consumer data by consumer reporting agencies where it is used or is
expected to be used for decisions about credit, employment, insurance, housing, and
similar eligibility determinations.55 However, it generally does not cover the sale of
consumer data for marketing and other purposes. The internet enables access to
increasing amounts of consumer data, both through currently legal methods, such as
“scraping” information from online platforms or purchasing information from
legitimate custodians of databases, and through expressly illegal methods, such as
hacking into private databases or purchasing data from others who have obtained
data by theft or misrepresentation.56 As a result, though the FCRA legislature clearly
intended to prevent individuals from being negatively exploited by use of their
personal data without their notice or consent, the data trafficking industry largely
operates outside its scope of protection.57 The FTC has identified three categories of

51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at iv.
53. Compare Traffic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/trafficker [https://perma.cc/MY9N-QHWZ] (defined as the “import and export trade,” “the
business of bartering or buying and selling,” or “illegal or disreputable usually commercial
activity”), with Broker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/broker [https://perma.cc/JM4T-MCRK] (defined as “one who acts as an intermediary” or
“one who sells or distributes something”). The verb “traffic” includes both legal and illegal
commerce, though it is frequently associated with the latter, whereas “broker” is a
nonpejorative term to describe an actor with a mediator function in commerce.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
55. Id. § 1681b.
56. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (liability for
intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access).
57. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 2 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer
-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/LZ9B-RFV9].
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data traffickers: (1) FCRA-covered entities; (2) entities that maintain data for
marketing purposes; and (3) non-FCRA-covered entities that maintain data for
nonmarketing purposes, such as to detect fraud or locate people.58 Two out of these
three categories are currently not subject to regulation.
Data traffickers acquire their data from a variety of sources, including state and
federal government sources, scraping or crawling 59 information from publicly
accessible websites, including social media, and purchasing access to other data
trafficker resources.60 All three of these methods present actual or potential legal
concerns. Using state records on driver’s licenses or voter registration is against
federal law and the law of many states, respectively. 61 Scraping information from
many websites, particularly many popular social media websites, such as Facebook,
is against their terms of service.62 Breaking a website’s terms of service is not only a
breach of contract, but it may also be a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA).63 The current prevailing interpretation of the CFAA interprets breach
of terms of service of an application as intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization or exceeding authorized access.64
Finally, and most significantly, many major data traffickers acquire most of their
resources from purchasing data from other data traffickers. 65 Data traffickers have
no legal, social, or financial incentive to avoid purchasing information from other
data traffickers that obtain information from illegal sources. There is no legal barrier
preventing data traffickers with high legitimacy levels from purchasing data from
entities that acquire their information from clearly illegal sources under the CFAA.

58. Id. at 65.
59. Web Scraping, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_scraping [https://
perma.cc/NP6M-JDZV] (“[D]ata scraping used for extracting data from websites.”); Web
Crawler,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/web
%20crawler [https://perma.cc/HMF6-ZP2U] (“[A] computer program that automatically and
systematically searches web pages for certain keywords.”).
60. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at 13–15.
61. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012) (federal law limiting
use of driver’s license registers). States restricting the use of voter registration information for
commercial and nonelection related purposes include California, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, South
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Voter List Information, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT,
http://voterlist.electproject.org [https://perma.cc/NS9K-SXBK].
62. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at 13 n.40.
63. For a full summary of how the CFAA is being used to make breach of a terms of
service criminal, see David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, not Dating: Reconstructing the
CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 926–42 (2013).
64. E.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); see also
Jamie Williams, Take Two: Ninth Circuit Revises Two Password Sharing Decisions, but Fails
to Fix CFAA Mess, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.eff.org
/deeplinks/2016/12/take-two-ninth-circuit-revises-two-password-sharing-decisions-fails-fixcfaa-mess [https://perma.cc/6736-HKGH].
65. All but one of the companies that the FTC identified as leaders representative of the
field bought data from other companies. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at 13. The nine
companies ordered to contribute information to the FTC study were Acxiom, Corelogic,
Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf, and Recorded Future. Id. at 8–9.
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Only a minority of leading data traffickers has chosen to “affirmatively evaluate the
legitimacy, stability, and quality of their sources before accepting data from them.”66
Cybersecurity threats increase daily throughout the economy, and over seventy-five
percent of cybersecurity attacks have financial motives.67 The status quo actively
encourages cybersecurity attacks, such as the high-profile breach of Equifax.68
Hackers can launder their data through the vast web of data traffickers.
By the time the most legitimate data traffickers, such as the ones interviewed by
the FTC, choose to purchase access to the data, the sources of the data have become
unclear. This is far from inevitable. Property law has a long history of using public
registers so prudent, good-faith buyers can purchase property with knowledge that
the title is clean and free of encumbrances. But the current law has no provisions for
the traffic of data that was hacked and resold. The legal need for plausible deniability
leads the majority of data traffickers to choose not to investigate where their data
came from. As for social pressure not to use stolen resources, the lack of public
knowledge regarding the trade in personal data shields all actors in the data
trafficking industry from accountability. This creates a disturbing reality in the status
quo: data traffickers who do not engage in illegal or even immoral activities
themselves have every incentive not to investigate where the data they purchase
comes from.
The most important thing to note about data trafficking practices for the forgoing
analysis is that there is no contractual relationship between the data traffickers and
the individuals with profiles in their databases. This factors the question of consent
out of the equation with respect to establishing the question of harm to consumers
because there is no agreement between the data traffickers and the subjects of the
information in the databases in the first place.69 This sets the stage for the application
of restitution.
A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability
in restitution.70 The rationale for the law’s implication for an obligation of the
enriched party to pay the other for the value of the resource received can be rooted

66. Id. at 16.
67. VERIZON, 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 7 (2016), http://www.verizon
enterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPA6
-B5NQ].
68. Andrew Liptak, Hackers Accessed More Personal Data from Equifax than Previously
Disclosed, VERGE (Feb. 11, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/11
/17001046/equifax-hack-personal-data-tax-identification-numbers-email-addresses-drivers
-licenses-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/55H3-S27X].
69. However, some have argued that consent has been given a burden it cannot sustain
even when there is apparent agreement to terms in online form contracts. See, e.g., Nancy S.
Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 800 (2007); Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy
Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors and the Limits of Contractual
Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 730 (2015).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
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in precedential71 or economic72 principles. While the precedential argument for
restitution will be discussed further below, the basic economic argument is worthy
of outline here. As Judge Richard Posner has observed in his treatise on the economic
analysis of law: “If a court is reasonably confident both that there would have been
a [contract] and what its essential terms would have been [where there are
prohibitively high transaction costs] . . . it does not hesitate to write a contract
between the parties after the fact. Note the analogy to maritime salvage.” 73
Data traffickers acquire data about individuals without contract with, or providing
services to, consumers. Furthermore, they profit from the data they acquire by selling
it to companies that provide services. It is impossible to decisively quantify the full
scope of the data trafficking entity given that a portion of it is based on the trade of
data that has been acquired through hacking. However, the FTC has surveyed a set
of nine well-known and presumably white hat,74 or mostly ethical, companies that
buy and sell data. Data traffickers sell products in three broad categories: (1)
marketing, (2) risk mitigation, and (3) people search.75 “These products generated a
combined total of approximately $426 million in annual revenue in 2012 for the nine
data brokers” that the FTC surveyed in 2014.76
Having summarized the characteristics of the data trafficking industry, the Article
will now look to analyze the potential causes of action entities 77 and individuals
whose data is acquired and sold without their notification or consent might have
against data traffickers.
Three principal categories of causes of action might be brought in the area of
consumer data trafficking: (1) tort law,78 (2) consumer contract law, 79 and (3)
restitution.80

71. See, e.g., Ross A. Albert, Comment, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human
Life, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 85, 124–25 (1986) (making an equitable argument for allowing
recovery for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by a nonprofessional rescuer when the rescuee
has been unjustly enriched).
72. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 168–69 (8th ed. 2011).
73. Id.
74. White Hat, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/white
%20hat [https://perma.cc/W6Z8-QXX2] (“[A] hacker who tests computer systems for
possible vulnerabilities so that they can be fixed.”).
75. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at 23 .
76. Id.
77. It is possible that artificial persons (i.e., companies and organizations) might have
their data trafficked. The same principles apply to such actors in the economy.
78. See Robert L. Rabin, Intangible Damages in American Tort Law: A Roadmap 19–22
(Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2727885,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727885 [https://perma.cc/C3FN-WNYE].
79. See Christoph Busch, The Future of Pre-Contractual Information Duties: From
Behavioural Insights to Big Data, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU CONSUMER AND CONTRACT
LAW 221 (Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., 2016); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Contracting over Privacy: Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2016) (discussing the
centrality of consumer contract law in privacy regulation); Kim & Telman, supra note 69.
80. See Thomas Camp, Restitution on a Partial Failure of Basis, 28 BOND L. REV. 21
(2016).
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Tort law is likely the most intuitive legal approach to address the behavior of data
traffickers. It provides the closest connection between general statements of law and
finding of liability. In brief, it would find, under some tort theory, that the data
traffickers acted wrongly and therefore have to make injured parties whole.
There are the four privacy torts listed in the Second Restatement of Torts: intrusion
upon seclusion, appropriation of likeness, public disclosure of private facts, and false
light.81 The Prosserian approach to the worry that privacy plaintiffs would bring too
many general claims into court was to consciously cabin the right into highly specific
fact patterns.82
In addition, there are many other torts specifically designated to protect privacy
that the state or federal government has sought to protect, such as revenge
pornography.83 So, if a court finds the torts match the behavior of the data traffickers,
there is liability. An issue with this approach for newly possible privacy
infringements, though, is that both the Restatement privacy torts and most statutory
provisions are designed to deal with specific delineated problems. When problems
are framed highly specifically, they struggle to apply effectively to newly possible
infringements created by technosocial developments. 84
Given the cramped nature of the privacy torts, a better avenue for tort law for data
trafficking lies in torts related to wrongful business practices. 85 This family of torts
has the aim of promoting basic fair play in commerce. This family of torts includes,
but is not limited to, fraud, theft, infringement of intellectual property, and breach of
fiduciary duty.86 They protect the moral standing of the law by not permitting con
artists to hide behind the law to achieve their ends. These torts also promote
economic efficiency by reducing the amount of money and time actors have to spend
on self-help mechanisms to prevent these wrongful acts.
The tort of tortious interference with a contract is instructive of how these torts
can be applied in the context of data trafficking.87 Given that most consumers interact

81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
82. Prosser, supra note 31, at 389, 422–23 (discussing the dangers of a vague and
overbroad cause of action for the general right “to be let alone”).
83. Christian Nisttáhuz, Comment, Fifty States of Gray: A Comparative Analysis of
“Revenge-Porn” Legislation Throughout the United States and Texas’s Relationship Privacy
Act, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 333, 356–63 (2018) (survey of state legislation on revenge
pornography).
84. See Celina Raffl, Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Christian Fuchs & Matthias Schafranek, The
Web as Techno-Social System: The Emergence of Web 3.0, http://fuchs.uti.at/wp
-content/uploads/web3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVB6-L2YR].
85. Not incidentally, this is the private law analogue of the unfair and deceptive business
practices enforcement power of the Federal Trade Commission, which has taken a leading role
in the regulation of information privacy and data security in the decades since the rise of the
public internet. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
86. See generally GABRIEL ABEND, THE MORAL BACKGROUND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
HISTORY OF BUSINESS ETHICS (2014); NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE:
MARKET AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One who
intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract
to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person
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via a platform of one sort or another that makes affirmative privacy representations,
if a data trafficker acts in a manner inconsistent with the platform’s terms of service,
in some circumstances, they might be said to be tortiously interfering with the
contract.
Many of the rights consumers possess in their personal information come from
contract law. Companies routinely expressly promise more with respect to privacy
and data protection than they deliver.88 In consumer contract law, the important
keystone to begin with is browsewrap and clickwrap agreements. Clickwrap
agreements are agreements in which consumers must click an “I agree” icon in order
to proceed with a transaction.89 Many courts have found clickwrap agreements to be
enforceable contracts, at least when the clickwrap terms are not overreaching or
abusive.90 Browsewrap agreements are agreements in which terms available on a
webpage purport to hold consumers who browse the website to have agreed to
terms.91 In these policies, most companies make representations about information
privacy and data use.92 “Most courts which have considered the issue . . . have held
that in order to state a plausible claim for relief based upon a browsewrap agreement,
the website user must have actual or constructive knowledge of the site’s terms and
conditions, and have manifested assent to them.”93
If a company engaging in data trafficking made representations to consumers
inconsistent with their practices, this exposes them to liability for breach of
contract.94 This is in addition to implied warranties or fiduciary duties to which a
custodian of personal information might be bound in the absence of proper
disclaimers, given the infeasibility of negotiated agreements. 95 Even if the data
traffickers are not in direct contract with the consumers whose data they acquire,
there may be circumstances under which privity with respect to contractual
obligations about what to do with personal information exist. Further, when a data

not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting
to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.”).
88. See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85.
89. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014).
90. E.g., Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to find
enforceable a clickwrap agreement that required consumers to bring all claims in Texas and
also required consumers to relinquish their right to bring a class action suit against Dell for
any reason whatsoever).
91. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175–76.
92. Aleecia M. McDonald, Robert W. Reeder, Patrick Kelley & Lorrie Faith Cranor, A
Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats, in PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES: 9TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 37–55 (Ian Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah
eds., 2009).
93. Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010).
94. Kelly D. Martin, Abhishek Borah & Robert W. Palmatier, Research: A Strong Privacy
Policy Can Save Your Company Millions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://hbr.org
/2018/02/research-a-strong-privacy-policy-can-save-your-company-millions [https://perma
.cc/QPL9-36Z8].
95. See Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would
Take 76 Work Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work
-days/253851 [https://perma.cc/EQW9-YR9E].
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trafficker acquires personal information about customers from a platform in conflict
with the platform’s terms of services, the data trafficker could be liable to the
platform under the CFAA.96
There is a widespread misconception among privacy advocates and commentators
that consumers cannot rely on contract law to bring privacy claims. 97 Two cases
addressing information privacy in the infancy of the consumer interest, the earlier of
which occurred in the mid-1990s, denied the coverage of particular privacy policies
as binding contracts. Some scholars have pointed to these same two cases as
evidence, more than two decades later, that courts and company practices deny the
applicability of contract law to privacy policies. This is empirically inaccurate. A
recent article by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz shows,
through an empirical study of cases over the past decade, that most courts actually
find privacy policies to contain bilateral binding promises between consumers and
companies.98 Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz expressly bemoan the myopia of many
privacy scholars in effectively extrapolating the law’s approach to privacy from two
rather idiosyncratic, lower-court cases, In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy
Litigation and Dwyer v. American Express Co.99 A failure to look beyond these two
cases leads to a broader myopia: missing that contract law and related interests may
be the primary source of consumer privacy rights is the status quo. Even where
representation by a company is not binding in contract, a showing of reliance on a
promise provides grounds for an individual to seek relief in promissory estoppel.100
Promissory estoppel lies where a party relies upon another’s promise, the defendant
knew the party would rely on the promise, and injury results. 101 While the doctrine
of promissory estoppel is not true contract law, relying as it does on reliance as
opposed to bargained-for exchange, it is a frequent fellow traveler of contract law,
as evinced by its presence in the Restatement of Contracts. That is to say, promissory

96. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); see also
Williams, supra note 64.
97. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 79. But see Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85,
at 595–96 (arguing that privacy policies are not contract law, relying on the cases discussed in
the text, and concluding: “Today, contract law—formal contract and promissory estoppel
—plays hardly any role in the protection of information privacy, at least vis-à-vis websites
with privacy policies. Contract law litigation theories have barely been attempted, as the
number of cases involving these theories has been exceedingly low over the past fifteen to
twenty years after the rise of privacy policies.”).
98. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 79.
99. In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(rejecting a hypothetical claim for damages based on “the loss of the economic value of their
information” because “[plaintiffs] had no reason to expect that they would be compensated for
the ‘value’ of their personal information . . . [and there is] no support for the proposition that
an individual passenger’s personal information has or had any compensable value in the
economy at large”); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding that the use of consumer data to target third parties did not violate the intrusion upon
seclusion or appropriation privacy torts because defendants were not disclosing particular
cardholders’ financial information and finding that “a single, random cardholder’s name has
little or no intrinsic value to defendants”).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
101. Id.
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estoppel tends to arise in a context where a contract could have or should have been
formed but, for some reason, was not properly formed.
Finally, I will consider restitution as a basis of liability. Restitution, in brief, is
liability for benefits received. Courts and commentators sometimes call this the
“freestanding” action in restitution, to emphasize that it is a basis of liability parallel
to torts and contract.102 This is to disambiguate this cause of action from restitution
as a remedy or measurement of relief. 103 Restitution lies when one person receives a
benefit from another when the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that,
as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.104 Restitution, it is
important to underscore, is not an action in tort or contract but, rather, a wholly
distinct basis of liability based purely on the unjust transfer of a thing of value.
The “unjust” in unjust enrichment is a term of art. Unjust enrichment is subject to
the following bright-line limitations:
(1) The fact that a recipient has obtained a benefit without paying for it
does not of itself establish that the recipient has been unjustly enriched.
(2) A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters
within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust
enrichment.
(3) There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit
voluntarily conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justify
the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract.
(4) Liability in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a
forced exchange: in other words, an obligation to pay for a benefit that
the recipient should have been free to refuse. 105
Subject to the above exceptions, the formula for finding an unjust transfer is
straightforward. First, the transfer by the plaintiff must be nondonative; that is to say,
the plaintiff did not intend to give the defendant something for nothing. 106 Second,
the plaintiff’s transfer must be received by the defendant knowing, or should have
knowing, that the plaintiff’s transfer was nondonative.107 There are several
circumstances where restitution tends to be a cause of action. 108 Dean Ward

102. E.g., Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 886 (1999).
103. The terminology in this area is notoriously confusing. See Commerce P’ship 8098
Ltd. P’ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(clarifying terms applied in restitution actions where plaintiff and defendant literally went to
trial before realizing they had briefed based on different definitions of “quantum meruit,” an
action in restitution). In my analysis, I use the Third Restatement’s formulation, which was
designed to minimize confusion by avoiding the use of ambiguous terms.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution.”); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1937).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
106. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Structure of Unjustness, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2012).
107. Id. at 1072.
108. See infra Part III.
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Farnsworth has illustrated the scope of the field by dividing situations where
restitution actions work into four basic categories: (1) mistakes, where neither party
intended the transfer; (2) conferrings, where the giver intended the transfer but the
recipient did not; (3) takings, where the recipient intended the transfer but the giver
did not; and (4) finally, failed contracts, where a transfer might have been intended
by both, but due to the failure of a contract to be created, unjust enrichment occurs
anyhow.109
As for the second element of the test for restitution, the element of enrichment, it
merely means there must be some basis for believing that there was a gain to the
defendant. Cases in which a legal wrong results in injury to the claimant but no
benefit to others are not part of the law of restitution.110
To return to our case study, the general argument for a restitution action applying
to data trafficking goes that if a data trafficker acquired personal information by
interception, scraping, hacking, purchase, or other acquisition of data that was
acquired by tortious or criminal means (for example, data from a data breach subject
to mandatory reporting), they are liable for unjust enrichment.
Before the Article begins the remedies analysis, though, it is worth noting that
only the tort avenue of liability requires a judge to evaluate harm to plaintiff. When
a contract has been breached, judicially determined harm to plaintiff is not a relevant
factor in determining either liability or availability of remedy. Under the bargainedfor theory of consideration endorsed by most modern courts, courts expressly defer
from judging the objective value for which each party bargained.111 For a court to
find a contract enforceable, to quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s influential
formulation, “the promise induces the detriment or that detriment induces the
promise.”112
Once liability in tort, contract, or restitution is established––and naturally the
application of any or all will be fact-sensitive even within the general category of
data traffickers––there remains the remedies question, that is, the question of what a
court does in response to a finding of liability.113
There are two principal types of monetary remedies available: (1) damages, where
relief is measured by loss to plaintiff; and (2) restitution, where relief is measured by
gain of defendant. Damages and restitution are both normally relief at law, rather
than equity.114 Restitution is considered a remedy at law or equity depending on
which remedy accounting the court chooses. 115 A claimant entitled to a remedy for

109. WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 2–3
(2014).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2011).
111. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 110 (8th ed. 2016).
112. Wis. & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903).
113. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161,
168 (2008).
114. Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1599
(2002).
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (“Liabilities and remedies within the law of restitution and unjust enrichment may have
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unjust enrichment “need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at
law.”116
There are several specific measures of restitution that courts use. 117 For the
purposes of this Part, I will focus on how courts measure monetary restitution. This
type of remedy is available in most cases and is most likely to come into play in most
nonmedical data trafficking cases, as will become apparent in my analysis below.
There are two questions that courts must consider when measuring restitution as
a remedy. First, can the defendant return what she took to the plaintiff? 118 If so, the
remedy is simply the return of what was taken. If not, the court must consider how
to value the degree of enrichment. This is difficult because many measurements of
the enrichment are possible. The possible monetary measures of enrichment are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the amount defendant saved as a result of the plaintiff’s efforts,
the cost the plaintiff spent to provide the benefit,
the amount the defendant said he would pay for the benefit,
the market value of the benefit, or
all the benefits the transfer produced for the defendant, including not
just the asset itself but any use value it had and any investment income
it produced.119

Some possible measurements of restitution are more financially generous to
plaintiffs than others.120 So, the second question courts must consider when
evaluating how to measure restitution when the resource cannot be returned is what
responsibility, if any, did the defendant have for her enrichment at the expense of the
plaintiff?121 The more responsibility the defendant has for her enrichment, the more
generous the measurement of damages. The responsibility of a defendant is evaluated
on a spectrum. An innocent recipient is one that received nonreturnable benefits that
she never asked for and had no opportunity to refuse. 122 In this case, restitution is
measured by the amount the recipient saved as a result of the transfer. This typically
is the lowest value way to assess the enrichment. For defendants who at least
requested the benefits received, though, the measurement of damages is no less than
the market value of the benefits.123 The courts’ logic here is that if the recipient

originated in law, in equity, or in a combination of the two.”).
116. Id.
117. Professor Samuel Bray discusses the economic implications and incentives created by
each measure of restitutionary remedy. Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics;
Economics, Meet Remedies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2018). The measures he discusses
include accounting for profits, constructive trust, equitable lien, rescission in equity, rescission
at law, and recovery in quasi-contract. Id. at 88.
118. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, at 105.
119. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 49–53 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (providing different possible measurements of restitutionary damages and
their bases).
121. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, at 105.
122. Id. at 105–06.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50 cmt. d (AM.
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requested the benefits but failed to settle the price, she was at least ready to pay the
market price for the benefits.124 This implies no judgment about the intentions of the
defendant.
Finally, there are the cases where the defendant is judged to have engaged in bad
behavior, either from failing to source a resource wrongfully acquired earlier in the
supply chain, acquiring the enrichment via blameworthy means short of an actionable
wrong in tort or criminal law, or literally acquiring the enrichment via means
wrongful in tort or criminal law. In the latter two of these cases, which involve
“conscious wrongdoers,” courts often measure restitution not just by the value of the
thing literally taken from the plaintiff but also all the gains that flowed from the
wrongdoing.125 This measurement of restitution is called disgorgement.
With few exceptions,126 a claimant entitled to a disgorgement remedy in
restitution might instead recover compensation for the injury caused by the
defendant’s tort or other breach of duty. Restitution becomes significant when it
affords remedial or procedural advantages by comparison with an action for
compensatory damages.127
The application of the case law to the case of data trafficking should be clear.
When one measures the remedy by market value, the amount of money at stake in
litigation against a data trafficker becomes clearly substantial. While it may be
difficult to put a dollar value on the value to a consumer of control over her personal
data, it is clear that databases of information about discrete consumers have immense
value in today’s economy. Companies have long resisted publicly acknowledging
the dollar value of data as data, prior to analysis via algorithm. Understanding
restitution as a potential form of liability could have the salutary effect of forcing this
valuation.
Furthermore, where the actions by the data trafficker are found to be blameworthy
or wrongful, the remedy could be measured in terms of disgorgement. This would
enable plaintiffs to collect not just the market value of their data but the value of all
the profits a data trafficker made through use of their data.
Despite the immense potential of this remedy, courts do not invariably consider
unjust enrichment as it is not always pleaded or requested by plaintiffs. 128 Some states
have included unjust enrichment expressly in their privacy statutes as a form of
relief.129 Courts have discussed when unjust enrichment applies to privacy claims,

LAW INST. 2011).
124. E.g., Anderson v. Schwegel, 796 P.2d 1035, 1038–39 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
126. FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, at 2–3 (arguing that mistaken transfers and conferrings
are cases in which restitution provides the only basis for liability and recovery).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2011).
128. E.g., First Amended Complaint for Invasion of Privacy, Unjust Enrichment, Violation
of California Civil Code Sections 2223 and 2224, and Violation of California Business &
Professions Code Section 17200 Et Seq., Shakib v. Discover Bank, No. CGC-02-416194 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2003) (providing an example of restitution pleaded properly as a cause of
action and source of relief). See generally 123 AM. JUR. TRIALS 433 (2018).
129. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007) (“The right of privacy is recognized in
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and several claims have been successful in recent years. 130 Courts have discussed
when injunctive relief applies to privacy claims. 131 Thus, even in an environment
where there are a depressed number of privacy court cases based on the idea of
concrete harm being a barrier to the courtroom for privacy and data security matters,
these alternative sources of relief other than compensation are important sources of
law for courts to consider. As a matter of common law, there is no reason for a court
not to consider all these rights and remedies when considering privacy cases.
However, restitution as both a freestanding cause of action and a remedy is far from
the psyche of judges, lawyers, and the public, largely for historical reasons. 132
Restitution has not been taught as a class in most law schools since the 1960s, so
there is a lack of facility with the field among practicing lawyers, judges, and law
professors.133
The available causes of action and remedies should be considered in light of the
principles that govern privacy in the United States. The Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs) are widely cited principles for the aims of privacy law. These
principles include the following:
(1) Transparency: ensuring no secret data collection; provides information
about the collection of personal data to allow users to make an informed
choice;
(2) Choice: giving individuals a choice as to how their information will be used;
(3) Information Review and Correction: allowing individuals the right to
review and correct personal information;
(4) Information Protection: requiring organizations to protect the quality and
integrity of personal information; and

this state. One whose privacy is unreasonably invaded is entitled to the following relief: . . .
[c]ompensatory damages based either on plaintiff’s loss or defendant’s unjust enrichment; and
. . . [a] reasonable amount for attorney fees.”).
130. E.g., Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735 (W.D.N.Y. 2017)
(holding insurance subscribers who brought action against healthcare providers and insurers,
asserting various federal and state law claims arising from data breach that occurred when
hackers secured access to confidential health care information through a cyber attack; court
found plaintiff alleged restitution claim); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (alleging that employer failed to maintain security of his personal identification
information in connection with theft of company laptops by other employee; court found
plaintiff alleged restitution claim); State v. Moua, 874 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
(finding that where defendant had engaged in identity theft, victims whose private identifying
information was stolen were entitled to restitution).
131. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding plaintiffs who
brought class action against AOL for state privacy law violations had Article III standing and
that, under the theories alleged, plaintiffs were eligible for compensatory damages, restitution,
injunctive relief, or punitive damages); see also Bovay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 1–14–
2672, 2017 WL 660595, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2017), appeal denied, 84 N.E.3d 363 (Ill.
2017) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on invasion of privacy, Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act, and unjust enrichment claims where plaintiffs alleged that defendant
“violated the terms of its privacy policy and Illinois law by wrongfully disclosing its credit
card customers’ ‘personal, private and confidential information’ to third-party marketers”).
132. See generally Laycock, supra note 113, at 268.
133. Murphy, supra note 114, at 1635.
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Accountability: holding organizations accountable for complying with
FIPPs.134
The FIPPs are influential in private practice where there are lacunas in the scope
of privacy law, where in-house counsel and consultants provide advice to companies
as to how to avoid the ire of government and consumers. 135
The FIPPs owe their influence largely to the fact that they remain the most
comprehensive, general policy statement on privacy made by the American federal
government.136 The problem with the FIPPs from the perspective of private law is
that they are framed in terms of overall aims for societal outcomes. They are not
explicit about what rights individuals should have and what recourse they have if
those rights are violated.
It is somewhat uncommon when one is considering bilateral rights and remedies
to expressly make arguments about fit between rights and remedies from a public
interest perspective.137 After all, the rejection of the doctrine of election of remedies
in the modern era says that provided that the cause of action is proven, the plaintiff
can have her choice of available remedies. 138 Furthermore, private law speaks in
terms of making the aggrieved party whole, which is down to the facts of each
particular case. Many argue that the private law should confine its considerations to
resolving these episodic conflicts justly. By contrast, in the constitutional law and
public international law literature, there is a rich literature on fit between right and
remedy.139
However, it is a mistake to allow the consideration of public interest arguments
to go unrealized in the application of general private law principles to the newly
possible. Whether expressly or not, many judges take into account the public interest
when considering cases. Fear of stepping on industry and industry-friendly
legislature toes in a growing new area of commerce may be a major factor in the

134. ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, A BASIC HISTORY (2017),
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3LQ-3JZ6] (providing
a history of the development of the FIPPs).
135. See generally KENNETH A. BAMBERGER AND DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015).
136. Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave
of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1220–23 (2013) (discussing the origin, scope,
and influence of the FIPPs in the development of privacy law).
137. There are an increasing number of exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Sarah R.
Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 773 (2012)
(arguing for a larger role for public interest in determining patent breach remedies); Nick
Gamse, Comment, Legal Remedies for Saving Public Interest Journalism in America, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 329, 348 (2011) (discussing the potential for property remedies to assist the goal of
promoting public interest journalism).
138. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-703 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978)
(“reject[ing] any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies
are essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for breach”).
139. E.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (rejecting rights essentialism and arguing that “[r]ights are dependent
on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very
existence”); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 695 (2008).
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overemphasis of harm in privacy cases. The problem with this is, naturally, courts
are not well suited for making this type of analysis in the context of a court case.
They are limited to the arguments made by each party and the discovery evidence
produced (if the case even gets to the discovery phase of litigation). This leaves
courts trying to act as public actors attempting to directly apply cost-benefit analysis
or deferring to the market as a superior arbiter of justness or business ethics.
When influential, general statements of federal agency policy like the FIPPs exist,
they should influence how courts interpret the common law, especially when they
are dealing with newly possible technology. Courts are well suited as a matter of
institutional competence to apply the FIPPs principles to the substantive law on the
books.140 The FIPPs make no reference to concrete harm at all. What the FIPPs found
most problematic about privacy invasions was the removal of control and agency and
the potential for exploitation by individuals. So, it does not make sense that harm and
its corollary remedy remain at the center of conversations about privacy. 141 Privacy
was about dignitary integrity for Brandeis and Warren. A focus on harm beyond
violation of right in privacy regulation has little basis as a matter of history, law, or
policy. What’s more, under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
FTC is specifically authorized to apply restitutionary remedies in its resolution of
privacy and data protection matters, under the broad category of “unfair or deceptive
practices.”142 The potential for restitutionary remedies is a factor for the FTC in
choosing which action to pursue against corporate actors. Restitution also assists the
FTC in determining the measurement of settlements with actors that it pursues
actions against on the basis of the FIPPs.
Given all of the above, restitution is likely the best choice among compensation,
restitution, and injunctive relief in many data trafficking matters. Substantively,
taking material of value from others (in this case, personal information) without their
knowledge or consent and profiting from it appears to be a colorable case of benefit
from another when the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as
between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it. Restitution as a freestanding
cause of action fits well with restitution as a form of relief. The first four FIPPs
support the idea that some forms of acquisition and retention of data by data
traffickers are unjust, and the last prong, which encourages accountability, invites
action by courts.
But even if the source of liability is not restitution, restitution is a proper source
of relief simply because it goes to the actual problem that data trafficking presents
society. Data has been taken from individuals—data that has more value in the
possession of the taker than the original possessor. To properly address the
wrongdoing performed by the trafficker, it makes sense to measure his benefit rather
than the cost to the aggrieved person. This is because the principal motivation for the
law’s action here is the wrongful profit and the incentives that it creates for

140. Lauren Henry, Note, Institutionally Appropriate Approaches to Privacy: Striking a
Balance Between Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Privacy Law, 51 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 193, 211 (2014).
141. Consider Spokeo and other instances of this foregrounding of harm/compensation as
a presumptive privacy remedy in court opinions, popular media, and scholarship. See Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 53 (2012).
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businesses, not what it means for the aggrieved party to possess what has been taken.
This is similar to the other areas of law where restitution is a common form of relief,
including commercial bribes and kickbacks, business opportunities, misuse of
confidential information, infringement of intellectual property, and conversion. 143
Again, the FIPPs support the actions of a judge here in their emphasis on the
unfairness of secretly collecting and benefitting from data without giving consumers
the opportunity to choose. The focal point of the FIPPs is the action of organizations
managing personal information, not harm to individual consumers, and in this way it
points to considering these broad social concerns in the framing of the remedy of
breach of the right.
There are a variety of common actions for which the form of relief is generally
restitution.144 These actions include bribery,145 commercial bribery,146 tortious
interference with a potential business opportunity, 147 professional conflicts of
interest,148 misuse of confidential information149 (perhaps the most intuitively similar
to privacy and data protection matters), infringement of intellectual property, 150

143. Brief of Restitution & Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
supra note 2, at 6–16; see also Hazel Carty, The Economic Torts and English Law: An
Uncertain Future, 95 KY. L.J. 845 (2007) (discussing economic torts in the context of unfair
trading).
144. Brief of Restitution & Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
supra note 2, at 6–18.
145. Bribery elements include: (1) an intent for a quid pro quo transaction and (2) a
promise or transfer of a thing of value. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Bribery §§ 6–7 (2009); see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 201, 666, 1952 (2012).
146. Commercial bribery elements include: (1) “offering or accepting a bribe to an
employee or other agent” and (2) “with the intent of influencing that person’s relationship with
his or her employer.” 12 AM. JUR. 2D Bribery § 16 (2009).
147. A claim for tortious interference with a prospective business opportunity requires:
“(1) a reasonable probability of a business opportunity; (2) the intentional, non-privileged
interference by the [defendant] with that opportunity; (3) proximate causation; and (4)
damages.” Tortious Interference, 25 BUS. TORTS REP. 79, 81 (2013). In Soterion Corp. v.
Soteria Mezzanine Corp., for example, “Soteria clearly met the first prong of this test, the court
concluded. While neither Tenet nor Lake Cumberland had signed an enforceable contract with
Soteria, this was not necessary to find tortious interference. Id.; see Soterion Corp. v. Soteria
Mezzanine Corp., No. CIV.A. 6158-VCN, 2012 WL 5378251, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2012).
148. George Chamberlin, Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Undue
Influence By Attorney in Self-Dealing with Client, in 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 1 (1991)
(providing a practical outline of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney); see
also Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
557 (2009) (arguing that the family of conflict of interest torts do not protect against betrayal
without economic loss and proposing new statutory law that would do so).
149. “An agent has a duty (1) not to use property of the principal for the agent’s own
purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not to use or communicate confidential information
of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also 138 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 113
(2014).
150. In a suit for copyright infringement under the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101
et seq., the plaintiff must generally prove that: “(1) the work is original, sufficiently creative
and within the subject matter of copyright; (2) the plaintiff is the registered owner of a valid
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trespass,151 conversion,152 rescission,153 and the slayer rule.154 Many of these causes
of actions have both criminal and noncriminal avenues of enforcement.
The methodological principle underlying this analysis is that privacy should be
treated like the interests it is most similar to––unless there are compelling policy
reasons not to do so. The FIPPs analysis above suggests that there are not compelling
policy reasons to not employ restitution as the ordinary measure of privacy remedies.
So, the Article now turns to discussing the ways in which the family of privacy
interests are similar to the areas where American law has seen fit to grant restitution
as an ordinary remedy.
Actions for which restitution is a frequent remedy can be divided into two rough
groups: (1) those actions that are primarily motivated by preserving the ethics of fair
play (bribery, commercial bribery, misuse of confidential information, and
infringement of intellectual property); and (2) those actions that are primarily
motivated by protecting the autonomy of individual decision-making power from
subversion (trespass, conversion, recession, and the slayer rule). 155 I say a “rough”
distinction because these two objectives are closely related.
First, I will discuss the business ethics aspect of actions for which restitution is an
ordinary remedy. The reason why there are laws against bribery or interference with
a business opportunity is because of a historical American norm in favor of protecting
fair play in market behavior.156 This is grounded either in morality and
socioeconomics, or both. The people who created the common law tradition that our

copyright; and (3) the defendant has wrongfully exercised one or more of the six exclusive
rights granted to the copyright owner.” 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 65 (1997).
151. To establish a prima facie case for trespass, the plaintiff must plead and prove the
following: “(1) A possessory or ownership interest at the time of the alleged trespass; and
(2) Intentional entry by defendant; and (3) Lack of permission, consent or authorization; or (4)
Refusal to leave after permission has been granted but thereafter withdrawn.” 61 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2d 467 (2014).
152. There are many different types of conversion, from embezzlement to just taking and
using someone’s computer without asking.
153. Florida’s rescission elements include the following: (1) “character or relationship of
the parties”; (2) “making of [a] contract”; (3) “existence of fraud, mutual mistake, false
representations, impossibility of performance, or other ground for rescission or cancellation”;
(4) “[t]hat the party seeking rescission has rescinded the contract and notified the other party
to the contract of such rescission”; (5) “[i]f the moving party has received benefits from the
contract, [it] should further allege an offer to restore these benefits to the party furnishing
them”; and (6) “that the moving party has no adequate remedy at law.” Billian v. Mobil Corp.,
710 So. 2d 984, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied, 725 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1998).
154. The Uniform Probate Code includes a nonoptional provision barring a person who
feloniously and intentionally kills a decedent from taking an intestate share from that decedent
and providing that any property that would have gone to the decedent passes as if the killer
had disclaimed his or her share. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993);
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2017) (providing that a “[k]iller [is] not entitled to
receive property or other benefits by reason of [a] victim’s death” under a will or under the
Florida Probate Code).
155. Cf. Carty, supra note 143, at 846 (making a similar distinction between economic torts
that require misrepresentation and “general” economic torts).
156. See generally ABEND, supra note 86.
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modern law is built on were predominantly religious men. So, laws mandating
business ethics allowed honest, God-fearing men to not be prejudiced against in their
ability to succeed by a law that will serve the interests of “evil” or irreligious men by
omission.157 Perhaps a more enduring argument in the current climate is the
socioeconomic argument: enable trust in interactions with others––it is efficient not
to have self-help antifraud mechanisms divert market resources. Furthermore, it is
socially beneficial that success not be down to being con artists, who effectively
accrue rents to themselves at the expense of others, but instead enable success in
business based on objectively valuable market contributions that benefit all actors.
Restitution is the normal measurement of relief in this family of cases because it
captures and removes the distortionary effect the bad behavior had on the market.
Merely returning the value lost to plaintiffs would not necessarily achieve this goal.
Similarly, allowing some actors to use exploitative personal data practices without
legal repercussions disadvantages actors who refuse to play ball.
Second, I will consider the series of actions that are grounded on preventing undue
influence over culturally and historically salient interests. Restitution is the normal
measurement of relief in this family of cases because the actor who behaved
wrongfully may not necessarily be disgorged of her gain if the measurement is
measured by compensation. The principle that the wrongdoer must not benefit from
her own wrong is paramount here. The idea that a core reason why the law protects
privacy is to do with giving individuals freedom from subversion, which has a long
history in privacy law and policy. This principle extends from Brandeis’ and
Warren’s declaration that privacy is “the right to be let alone” to modern formulations
of privacy as relational autonomy and freedom from exploitation. 158
In Privacy as Quasi-Property, I argued that the Restatement torts were not
disjointed but rather reflected a common consideration of a two-step quasi-property
analysis. To determine whether there is a right to exclude from a quasi-property
interest, one considers: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the context of the
parties’ interactions, including the characteristics and social status of each party; and
(3) the wrongful nature of the defending party’s actions. 159 First, a plaintiff argues
that a defendant has disturbed a privacy or data protective interest of a plaintiff,
arising from a relationship, social context, or harm to a plaintiff. Harm or unjust
enrichment arises from data processing or data dissemination when:
(1) there is a relationship of trust between the two parties that makes it
reasonable for the plaintiff to expect her data would not be handled in
that way; and/or (2) society deems it morally wrong or outrageous for
data to be processed or disseminated in such a way; and/or (3) the
information is being processed or disseminated by the defendant in a way

157. See M.H. Hoeflich, On the Christian Origins of American Legal Ethics, J. KAN. B.
ASS’N, May 2017, at 49, 53.
158. Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World (Dec. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3306006 [https://perma.cc/78UV-9WM4].
159. Scholz, supra note 24, at 1123.
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that [either] subjected [the] plaintiff to harm [or risk of harm or unjustly
enriched the defendant].160
Both the common law and the FIPPs and FTC practice support considering
restitution as the normal remedy for privacy infringements. Bringing the FIPPs into
the analysis of cases is not necessary for the finding that restitution should be a
prominent source of relief in data trafficking and potentially other species of privacy
matters. However, the FIPPs provide judges who already consider their actions a
quasi-public law balance between the interests of private actors to process data and
the interest an individual has in her data not being an involuntary subject of
commerce with additional support for the finding that restitutionary relief is proper.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING REMEDIES INTO PRIVACY LAW ANALYSIS
Rights and remedies are interdependent and, especially in difficult cases, they
should be considered with awareness of one another, not sequentially. This is not to
say they are coterminous, as some legal realists argue.161 Rather, I take the
intermediate position that possible privacy remedies show the boundaries of the
privacy right in any particular case. Showing that the privacy interest has limits is
important in convincing courts to enforce the right. 162
I have argued that the general mechanism that unites the broad range of privacy
interests is the fact that privacy interests are quasi-property interests.163 Quasiproperty is a relational entitlement to exclude. Unlike real property, there is no
freestanding right to exclude from a quasi-property interest absent reference to a
relationship between individuals. Rather, the right to exclude arises from the
behaviors of the plaintiff and defendant. A defendant is identified based on a trigger
arising from a relationship, action, or harm to a plaintiff. When considered in light
of damages, we can see more clearly when the relational thing has been infringed
upon.
The use of remedies to help bound the right is a primary reason for the
enforcement difference between enforcement in privacy and its related quasiproperty interests, trade secret law and right of publicity. 164 As trade secret expert

160. Id. at 1137–38 (footnote omitted). Privacy as Quasi-Property used “harm” as a
shorthand for “cognizable ground for legal remedy.”
161. Legal realists refused to fully appreciate the necessary “gaps” between rights and
remedies due to a variety of institutional and practical factors. See Stephen A. Smith, Rights
and Remedies: A Complex Relationship, in TAKING REMEDIES SERIOUSLY 31 (Robert J. Sharpe
& Kent Roach eds., 2009). But see HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY (2013) (offering a nuanced and charitable
modern reading of American legal realism).
162. See Calo, supra note 27.
163. See Scholz, supra note 24, at 1123.
164. Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age of
Mass Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119 (2013); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy:
What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667;
Victoria Schwartz, Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Analogies, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 143 (2015); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages (Univ. of Fla.
Levin Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17-25, 2016),
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Sharon Sandeen has observed, “[p]rivacy law in the United States is frozen in amber
. . . [w]hat distinguishes modern trade secret law from the current state of information
privacy law are the procedural and substantive ways in which these issues were
addressed.”165 In a carefully researched article, Sandeen compared the history of
privacy law to the history of trade secret law. 166 The primary difference she found is
that while modern privacy law is almost exclusively based on the writings of three
privacy scholars prior to 1960, the law of trade secret was developed by a group of
professors, lawmakers, and practicing lawyers in the 1970s and 1980s.167 Given that
the description and enforcement of remedies is a significant part of practice, but a
less developed area of theoretical interest, it makes sense that a practice-oriented
group would have an account of remedies for trade secret that had substance.168 Since
trade secret matters actually are litigated and contracted about expressly, the
academic literature has been able to effectively track the business models created by
the existing trade secret environment and propose reform informed by a deep bank
of case law and practice.169
Privacy’s original sin, then, inherited from the landmark articles that first
theorized privacy infringement as a cause of action, is to assume all regulatory issues
can be worked out without reference to remedies. This is unrealistic in an era where
at least a thin legal realism is nearly universally accepted. This Article proposes that
scholars, advocates, and businesses seriously consider that the main way that the
privacy interest should be regulated––and hopefully protected––is through
describing remedies, not limiting and defining the right. We need not go as far as
Llewellyn in declaring that there is no difference between right and remedy, but the
case of the privacy interest as discussed in this Article suggests that modern judges
and legal scholars might benefit by taking their interdependence more seriously.
If courts find a reasonable likelihood of showing restitutionary recovery sufficient
for passing muster at the motion to dismiss phase of a lawsuit––as this Article
suggests they should––it will be easier for privacy claims to be judged on their merits.
More cases in which privacy cases are judged on the merits would be a good thing
for helping to clarify privacy norms in the modern era. Furthermore, they would
allow a broader range of the public to feel as though they have a stake and a claim
on the developing information economy. This would help solidify the legitimacy of
large information economy actors, who are increasingly regarded with suspicion by
the general public due to their power and lack of institutional accountability. 170

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2842325
[https://perma.cc/6TWJ
-82B6] (empirical analysis of trade secret recovery of relief).
165. Sandeen, supra note 164, at 667, 671.
166. Id. at 673–92.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 692–704.
169. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (describing a trend toward the
increasing use of trade secrets claims to prevent outside scrutiny of algorithmic systems).
170. Noam Cohen, Silicon Valley Is Not Your Friend, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/13/opinion/sunday/Silicon-Valley-Is-Not
-Your-Friend.html [https://perma.cc/M63Z-H45X]; David Streitfeld, Tech Giants, Once Seen
as Saviors Are Now Viewed as Threats, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes
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The barriers to voicing and enforcing a privacy infringement are best illustrated
by an example. Peter Thiel, a wealthy entrepreneur, hated Gawker because the
website outed him as a gay man to the public without his consent. 171 So, he
bankrolled litigation in order to undermine Gawker financially. He chose to fund
Hulk Hogan’s invasion of privacy case against Gawker, and thus, one of the most
visible and financially successful privacy court cases was initiated. A court ruled for
Hulk Hogan on a theory of invasion of privacy. 172 As for remedies, he was awarded
compensatory damages and unjust enrichment.
The average American does not have Thiel’s resources. Many privacy cases are
dismissed at the motion to dismiss phase for a failure to show concrete harm. The
standard for whether privacy harms pass muster in federal court is murky and was
not clarified by the Supreme Court when it squarely addressed the issue in Spokeo v.
Robins.173 This means that few lawyers will take privacy matters on a contingency
basis, even for a class action suit. When cases are not likely to be brought on a
contingency basis, the universe of plaintiffs contracts sharply. We must ask: Are
there few privacy plaintiffs because of financial constraints or because most people
simply do not see why privacy advocates deem privacy concerns as problematic at
all?
The jarring difference between American privacy-protective beliefs and actions174
and their widespread use of services that expose their personal information to data
brokers is well known. There are two stories to explain the public’s behavior, even
presuming each member of the American public is homo economicus. The happy
story is that they are lying to themselves and their behavior tells us they really do
prefer the status quo and do not care about the broad exposure of private information.
The sadder story is that they do not prefer the broad exposure of their private
information, but on an individual basis it simply is not worth the time, expense, and
social cost to choose not to engage in the modern economy by choosing not to use
credit cards and email. Most Americans believe––probably rightly––that there is no
way the average person can avoid extensive privacy invasions in the modern world.
Since an individual protesting privacy-invasive applications would have limited
effect anyway, it is rational for a person who would prefer greater privacy protections
to use privacy-invasive applications. Perhaps most probably, the population has a
mix of people with both attitudes. Since there is no realistic avenue for privacysensitive consumers to make claims or alternative places for them to bring their
business, we simply do not have the information to conclude whether the happy story
or the sad story is the real one.

.com/2017/10/12/technology/tech-giants-threats.html [https://perma.cc/5GNJ-HRYM].
171. Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan
-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/PN88-SQXW].
172. Id.
173. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); e.g., Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo,
265 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2016); Solove & Citron, supra note 11, at 743.
174. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human
Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509 (2015) (highly privacy protective and
concerned about their own privacy, as demonstrated by surveys and choice to use privacyprotective patches and apps).
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The use of the characteristic generalist reasoning of judges judging privacy
opinions on the merits will allow a richer body of substantive privacy law to arise.
Litigation serves a variety of functional goods relevant here. 175 One of them is an
information-cultivating function. Another is a claim recognition and allowing for a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. According plaintiffs a real ability to have privacy
claims heard in court also takes the burden off of the FTC to be the primary vehicle
for enforcing privacy rights. Scholars have acknowledged the leading role the FTC
plays in consumer privacy, usually approvingly. 176 But there are some limitations to
the FTC’s approach. First, the FTC does not directly serve consumer complaints, so
the claim-vindicating function the courts have cannot be vindicated. Second, the FTC
is limited in the number of cases it can take, so the information-serving function is
lower relative to the courts. Finally, the FTC typically ends cases with consent orders,
which have no precedential value and allow the company to disclaim admission of
wrongdoing.
The common law as it is practiced in state courts matters because it itself is a
backstop and way of directly regulating the newly possible before the administrative
state gets involved. And if courts act, it will spur legislatures to reinforce or correct
the decisions—no New Deal-era reforms without the morass of cases in the early
twentieth century with courts trying to deal with the industrial age. Of course, there
may be immense value to subsequent legislative and administrative state action, but
the “first responders” are and should be in common law courts.177 Business practices
do not speak in the kind of way that is particularly useful for policy crafting. Court
matters translate business disputes into fact-intensive guides for behavior. Human
reasoning and conscious choice about values to be implemented are unavoidable in
regulating the newly possible. The courts, in implementing general common law
principles––closely related as they are to the morals of the recent past––must not
shirk their role as the front line in figuring out the legal rules of tomorrow.
Taking remedies seriously in the evaluation of privacy rights allows the law to
enforce substantial cases of privacy infringement while limiting the impact of cases
that are only marginal.178 The interest need not be limited at the interest phase in
order for enforcement to be limited to the cases that matter. For an analogy, consider
an example from elsewhere in tort law. Gary and Ash are rivals. If Gary pushes Ash,
causing Ash to stumble but not fall, Gary has committed battery. The elements of
civil battery are: intent (not criminal intent to cause injury, necessarily, but intent to
commit the act), contact (nonconsensual contact with the individual or his/her
effects, such as clothing), and harm (actual harm, meaning physical, mental, or
emotional).179 However, it is unlikely that Ash will even consider the harm sufficient

175. See generally ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017) (arguing that
litigation helps democracy function through enforcement, transparency, participation, and
equality).
176. E.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85. But see Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security
and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 959 (2016).
177. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 694–95 (2007).
178. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“An actor is subject
to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
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to be a legal controversy,180 and even if he did, he is unlikely to get a full hearing in
even a court of general jurisdiction, much less damages. If, by contrast, Gary drove
a car over Ash’s leg, Ash probably would be able to go into court and get
compensatory remedies from Gary. The reason why the courts would accept the
second case between the rivals, but not the first, is not because the elements of battery
were not met in the first case. Rather, it is because in the second case Ash could make
an argument that he was entitled to substantial compensatory damages for his
injuries. In the first case, any damages from a push that causes another person to
stumble, but not fall, would be nominal. Even the dignitary damages in the matter
would not be at a level that would normally fall within the scope of law.
Instead, courts (and, where relevant, administrative agencies) can explicitly
choose not to allow privacy matters to proceed forward where there is not a
significant compensatory, restitutionary, or dignitary interest at stake. To do this,
they must expressly evaluate possible sources of relief.
Several factors influence how remedies are measured. These factors break down
into two categories: (1) the remedy’s ability to adequately deter invasive conduct,
and (2) the proportionality of the remedy. These factors both have support in case
law and reflect how the FTC has determined settlement quantities in privacy matters.
Let us walk through the two factors for measurement of restitutionary remedies in
turn.
A. Deterrence
Restitution creates different incentives for actors in society than compensation. 181
Professors Ariel Porat and Robert Cooter have summarized the difference as follows:
“Tort law usually makes the injurer internalize wrongful harms through damages. In
contrast, restitution law does not enable the benefactor to internalize the benefits she
confers on others without their request, through damages, and only seldom allows
her to recover for the costs she incurs in creating those benefits.”182
When the law enables choosing restitution, it does so to deter the pernicious
effects of particular types of free riding.183 For example, free riding could lead to the

with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,
and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”).
180. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980).
181. ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING TORTS,
CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 10–11 (2014); see also Saul Levmore & William J. Stuntz,
Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
483, 486–90 (discussing compensation versus disgorgement in tort law from a law and
economics perspective); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Internalization and Deterrence in the
Law of Torts and Restitution (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
182. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Torts and Restitution: Legal Divergence and Economic
Convergence, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302807 [https://perma.cc/J992-G2JC].
183. “By definition, disgorgement damages make the injurer give up his gain from
imposing risk on the victim. If the injurer does not expect to gain by imposing risk on the
victim, he might as well not impose any. Consequently, disgorgement damages are the
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encouragement of negative behaviors (such as theft and misappropriation of data in
our central example in Part II) and the discouragement of positive behaviors (such as
cleaning up pollution in a river many actors share).184 The incentive to engage in both
types of free riding could be diminished by the availability of recovery in restitution.
Consideration of this factor shows that there are times when compensation will
be a superior and necessary remedy in privacy matters with different facts from this
Article’s core example.185 Compensation, properly considered, might not be an
inappropriate or inadequate solution in all privacy matters.
B. Proportionality
Courts should have based their holdings on the explicit weighing of the likelihood
of recovery remedies in compensation, restitution, and equity. Prosser, when framing
the four privacy torts that appear in the Restatement, specifically mentioned that his
goal in dividing the privacy interest into four specific cases was to prevent the
aimless spread of the right to privacy and limit the privacy right’s impingement on
speech, innovation, and other valuable interests. 186 However, at least in the modern
era, limiting the scope of a right is not how we limit enforcement. A right is no right
without a remedy. Rather, we evaluate whether the law can be called upon to defend
a right based on whether remedies could reasonably be argued to be available to the
plaintiff. In restitution as a remedy, the measurement is of the enrichment. 187 This
builds proportionality into the enforcement of the right.
These two principles help rationalize the use of remedies to enforce privacy rights
and provide a way of looking forward to how remedies will enforce rights. The
practical scope of a right is delimited by the choices courts make in measuring relief
for infringement of that right. Privacy is a private right for which this relationship is
particularly critical for creating the practical scope of the right. This framework is
likely transferable to other private rights.
***
Deterrence and proportionality are guiding principles to be used in measurement
of restitutionary remedies. But determining what calculations, exactly, courts (or
administrative agencies, where applicable) must do to measure restitutionary
damages are a ripe area for research. Expert witnesses will need to produce numbers
about how much a given database is worth to the company. While the company may
have processed the data in ways that increase its value, as discussed above, some
measurements of restitution, based on the culpability, involve disgorgement of the
benefit accrued.

minimum damages that deter the injurer from imposing the risk of an accident on the victim.”
Id. at 6.
184. Id. at 10.
185. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1711, 1713 (2010).
186. See Prosser, supra note 31, at 422–23.
187. A full discussion of the role of defendant responsibility in money remedies appears in
supra Part II.
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Some existing work has been done that may touch on how stakeholders and
governments measure restitutionary remedies in privacy and data protection actions.
European scholars and policy centers did work on restitutionary methods of
measuring remedies in conjunction with developing the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)’s approach to setting its fines for violation of the GDPR.188
Some scholars have begun to examine the data insurance industry and interrogated
how insurance company actuaries develop insurance premiums. 189 Some work in
industry and white paper publications has been done on describing the phenomenon
of cy pres settlements in privacy cases.190 Existing work in this area, although
illuminating, does not address the question of the systematic underuse (at least in
explicit court judgments) of restitutionary remedies. So, the insurance numbers are
smaller than they should be, and the cy pres settlements are inadequate as a result.
Both these sorts of studies take for granted a legal landscape based on an incorrect
assumption that the normal measure of privacy remedies is compensation. The
normal measure of privacy remedies should be restitution.
Future projects for understanding restitutionary remedies for privacy
infringements could take many forms. For example, a particular formula or series of
formulae could be proposed and evaluated for determining restitutionary remedies.
Or, a qualitative study of experts employed to help negotiate cy pres privacy
settlements could be done to determine how they propose, modify, and settle upon
numbers in these settlements and, based on this, propose what changes would need
to be made to their analysis. Finally, the research agenda should prioritize research
that attempts to value databases, which would be useful for determining the benefit
to companies of having databases of personal information. Perhaps the most accurate
way to measure this is to evaluate, either through economic models or qualitative
interviews, how investment professionals evaluate the value of companies that rely
on the value of personal information. This type of work would help guide courts and
administrative agencies in determining remedies based on benefit to data user, rather
than cost to data subject.
Privacy interests serve as the canary in the coal mine in the information age. It is
untenable that companies can at once take advantage of the huge commercial value
of databases on the one hand and also purport that the material it is made from is
valueless on the other. Databases of personal information should have measurable
value just like any other major corporate resource, like an executive or a factory. The
availability of restitutionary remedies for privacy is one avenue for putting pressure

188. GDPR Key Changes, EU GDPR.ORG, https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/P9DQ-NWM3].
189. E.g., Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas Kuehn & Therese Jones, Content
Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies (RAND Justice, Infrastructure & Env’t, Working Paper
No. WR-1208, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers
/WR1200/WR1208/RAND_WR1208.pdf [https://perma.cc/73YQ-L89R].
190. John Black & James R. Steel, Privacy Developments: Private Litigation, Enforcement
Actions, and Settlements, 73 BUS. LAW. 177 (2018); Marc Rotenberg & David
Jacobs, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action Litigation and the Challenge
of Cy Pres, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
APPROACHES 307 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016).
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on companies to be accountable for use, a critical feature of the twenty-first century
business model.
CONCLUSION
The extent to which a right is enforceable is fundamental to whether an individual
has any meaningful right at all. Therefore, it is critical to take remedies out of the
shadows and into the center of the discussion of privacy rights. Doing so reveals that,
in many important cases, restitution is the appropriate remedy for privacy invasion.
Taking restitutionary remedies seriously solves privacy’s “harm problem.”
Article III standing can be met by showing a plausible case for relief in the form of
restitution. In many instances, profitability of a defendant’s business model built on
the use of personal data would illustrate the plausibility of relief on the basis of
disgorgement of a benefit. Sidestepping the question of how harm can be shown in a
privacy matter would lead to more privacy cases being evaluated on the merits.
Privacy cases reaching the merits would create a rich body of case law examining
and defining the privacy interest in particular cases. Common law has an important
role to play in enabling the law to determine how to contend with newly possible
social phenomenon based on existing social values and basic liberal principles of
governance. While generalist courts may not be the best permanent regulator for all
aspects of information privacy, case law in an area of social and technological change
can guide legislatures and industry stakeholders to develop principled approaches for
incorporating traditional business ethics into the information economy.

